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Abstract. The EPC Class-1 Generation-2 (Gen2 for short) is a standard Radio
Frequency Identification (RFID) technology that has gained a prominent place on
the retail industry. The Gen2 standard lacks, however, of verifiable security func-
tionalities. Eavesdropping attacks can, for instance, affect the security of mon-
itoring applications based on the Gen2 technology. We are working on a key
establishment protocol that aims at addressing this problem. The protocol is ap-
plied at both the initial identification phase and those remainder operations that
may require security, such as password protected operations. We specify the pro-
tocol using the High Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL). Then, we
verify the secrecy property of the protocol using the AVISPA model checker tool.
The results that we report show that the current version of the protocol guarantees
sensitive data secrecy under the presence of a passive adversary.
1 Introduction
The RFID technology is one of the most promising advances in current pervasive in-
frastructures. It allows contactless identification of tagged objects and people. The EPC
Gen2 standard, short-hand for the Electronic Product Code (EPC) Class-1 Generation-
2 [8], is a proper example of this technology. Most promising Gen2 scenarios relay
on passive tags designed with very basic capabilities. Gen2 tags derive their transmis-
sion and computational power from the signal of an interrogating device. Albeit they
can perform some basic arithmetic operations, they are characterized with a very min-
imalist design, specially with regard to the implementation of security functionalities.
For this reason, the security of the EPC Gen2 technology is gaining great attention in
both industry and academia [9],[10]. One important focus of research is the inclusion
of verifiable secure key establishment protocols, to prevent eavesdropping attacks [12].
In this regard, we present in this paper a work-in-progress protocol that aims at ad-
dressing the aforementioned objective. We present the protocol and describe its trans-
lation into High Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL), a specification lan-
guage for formalizing protocols and security goals based on Lamport’s Temporal Logic
of Actions (TLA) [13]). Finally, we evaluate the translated description with the AVISPA
model checker tool, a well known EU funded software verification framework for the
automatic validation of security protocols [1]. The initial results that we report show
that the protocol guarantees secrecy in the presence of a passive adversary.
Paper Organization. Section 2 motivates our work. Section 3 describes the protocol.
Section 4 presents some necessary assumptions. Section 5 overviews the AVISPA tool
and the HLPSL format. Section 6 models the protocol in HLPSL and summarizes the
results of the automatic verification process. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Motivation
Flawed Gen2 Security Model. The Gen2 specification considers some special oper-
ations that require reader authentication, such as tag memory writing, decommission
of tags, and tag self-destruction. They require the communication of a password prior
the tag execution. Such a password must be sent via the insecure reader-to-tag channel.
Since this channel is more likely to suffer from eavesdropping attacks than the tag-to-
reader channel, the specification proposes to protect the exchange as follows:
1. READER −→ TAG : Key-request
2. TAG −→ READER : Key
3. READER −→ TAG : Password ⊕ Key
The reader informs in Step 1 that it is waiting for a key necessary to obscure the
following exchange (cf. Step 3) that will eventually contain the required password to
grant the execution of the operation. The key can also be used in order to obscure the
contents of the remainder parts of the operation (e.g., to protect the data associated to
a memory writing operation). The key is generated by the tag as a random bit string,
and transmitted in Step 2 in plaintext to the reader. This is done via the tag-to-reader
channel which, in principle, is expected to have an eavesdropping range much lower
that the reader-to-tag channel. This exchange supposes that an adversary eavesdropping
the reader-to-tag channel cannot capture the sensitive data (either the password or the
contents of the password-protected operation). However, it is straightforward that an
adversary capable of eavesdropping the tag-to-reader channel using special hardware
devices (e.g., readers with high sensitive receivers and multiple antennas), or predicting
the output of the random bit generator of the tag (e.g., based on a flawed EPC Gen2
pseudorandom generator), can simply obtain such a sensitive data by applying the ob-
tained key and an Exclusive-OR operation.
Lack of Formally Verified Security Enhancements. There have recently been many
approaches focusing on enhancing the security of the EPC Gen2 technology [10]. Some
of these approaches propose physical solutions, including new cryptographic primitives
on-board of the tags; others propose straighforward protocols, that remain to be adapted
to the Gen2 contsraints. However, a great number of solutions have been reported as
insecure. For instance, recent cases of authentication techniques for EPC Gen2 were
reported vulnerable by Li and Wang in [15]; by Li and Deng in [14]; and by Cao,
Bertino, and Lei in [6]. These cases show the lack of formal verification of new security
techniques for EPC Gen2, which we consider deemed necessary.
3 Proposed Key Establishment Protocol
The protocol aims at establishing a secure communication between a reader and a tag
without any advance exchange of a secret key. This assumes the existence of a shared
generation function denoted by KeyGen. The KeyGen function generates for each
exchanged message a secret key named derived key (e.g., KDer-i) relying on some ini-
tialization values (e.g., a master key KMaster, a timestamp t). The validity of the derived
keys depends on the validity of the master key. This validity is decided by a third entity
(not described in this work) through a computational approach after a fixed number of
use. In the sequel, we present the three main stages of the protocol.
1. Reader Authentication. The reader must first prove its identity to the tag. We assume
that preserving on-board tag generated data is the aim of our protocol. Thus, we con-
sider that readers are likely to be dishonest rather than tags. Moreover, the constrained
capacity of the tag (mainly, the lack of energy) to follow all the communication process
or to disturb it, weaken the possibility for a tag to play the role of an adversary. The
reader authentication steps are described below.
1. READER −→ TAG : ReadID
2. TAG −→ READER : TagID
3. READER −→ TAG : TagID ⊕ KDer0
4. TAG −→ READER : KDer1
The reader requests the identification of the tag (denoted by the ReadID command)
in Step 1. As a result, the reader receives in Step 2 the tag identification (denoted as
TagID). The reader verifies the existence of this identification in its related database
and extracts the last state of the identified tag (e.g., master key, timestamps, internal
vectors). This state allows to derive a new derived key named KDer0, based on the
master key KMaster. The result of this generation is XORed with the received TagID
and sent to the tag in Step 3. Upon receiving the message TagID ⊕ KDer0, the tag
generates a new key from the shared KeyGen function and checks the equality of this
new generated key and the received value. If they are equal, the tag generates a new
derived key with the same function and sends it as an acknowledgement to the reader
in Step 4.
2. Master Key Assignment. The reader distributes now a new master key to refresh the
protocol state on the two sides.
5. READER −→ TAG : (Knew-Master,t) ⊕ KDer2
6. TAG −→ READER : Knew-Der0
The reader sends in Step 5 a new calculated master key concatenated with a times-
tamp t, XORed together with KDer2 which is generated using the initialized master key.
The tag, in turn, calculates a new K’Der2 and checks the correctness of the sent KDer2
by applying an XOR operation as follow: (Knew-Master,t)⊕ KDer2 ⊕ K’Der2. If KDer2
= K’Der2, the tag obtains (Knew-Master,t) using the nilpotency property (cf., Section
4), and recognizes the shared timestamp t to eventually deduce the Knew-Master. Fi-
nally, the tag updates its variables and acknowledges in Step 6 a new derived key using
the KeyGen function initialized by the new received master key.
3. Remainder Gen2 Operations. The system can now continue with other Gen2 oper-
ations, such as reading or writing data from/to the tag. For instance, the following steps
exemplify the protocol part associated to a Write operation:
7. READER −→ TAG : oprequest ⊕ Knew-Der1
8. TAG −→ READER : Knew-Der2
9. READER −→ TAG : (data,t) ⊕ Knew-Der3
10. TAG −→ READER : Knew-Der4 ⊕ opreply
The reader sends in Step 7 a request command named oprequest XORed with a
new derived key. oprequest is a command to have the permission for writing. The tag
checks the authentication of the reader by verifying Knew-Der1 and acknowledges the
request by sending in Step 8 a new derived key generated using the KeyGen function.
The reader sends in Step 9 the data to be written. Upon accepting the data, the tag
replies in Step 10 with a new derived key XORed with a predefined command opreply
to acknowledge the operation.
4 Assumptions prior the Verification Process
We want to decide whether the protocol ensures the secrecy of some sensitive terms
(e.g, the master key that can reveal the sequence of the derived keys) under a number of
assumptions, namely the encryption model and the adversary capabilities. By ensuring
secrecy, we expect that the adversary cannot deduce from his initial knowledge of the
protocol and the environment of its execution and from the set of messages sent in a
given execution more than what he is permitted to know.
Encryption Model. The hypothesis of perfect encryption inspired by the Dolev-Yao
model [7], has been long assumed in the modeling of cryptographic protocols. This
hypothesis idealizes the cryptography used in the functions. It allows to overcome the
complexity of these functions by embedding the algebraic properties of the crypto-
graphic primitives into black boxes (i.e., the only way to decrypt a message is to know
the encryption key). This assumption has allowed to find numerous logical flaws in
protocols (e.g., in the Shamir 3-pass protocol [18]).
We relax the perfect encryption hypothesis by exposing the cryptographic primitives
used in our protocol and analyzing them according to their algebraic properties. We
explicitly define an encryption method based on a one time pad using the XOR operator
(e.g., a message m encrypted with a key k is denoted as m ⊕ k). The XOR operator is
known to have four properties that constructs a deduction rules for the adversary:
1. x ⊕ y = y ⊕ x (Commutativity)
2. x ⊕ (y ⊕ z) = (x ⊕ y) ⊕ z (Associativity)
3. x ⊕ 0 = x (Neutral element)
4. x ⊕ x = 0 (Nilpotency)
Adversary Capabilities.We consider a passive adversary. The introduction of the prop-
erties of the XOR operator that weaken the assumption of a perfect encryption extends
the capabilities of the adversary and strengthen his deduction possibilities. The adver-
sary has an entire control of the communication channels. It can harvest his knowledge
by using, at first, the information he initially knows about the participants, the network
characteristics and the algebraic properties of the protocol (e.g., the standards used in
the communication or the key generation algorithm) and, at second, by eavesdropping
the different messages sent in the network to use them as input of his deduction process.
5 The AVISPA Model Checking Tool
5.1 A Brief Presentation
AVISPA [1] is a suite of applications commonly used for automated validation and
verification of cryptographic protocols. It maintains a library of security protocol spec-
ifications written in the HLPSL language (e.g., 54 IETF protocols are tested). For each
protocol, the expected security properties and the possible attacks found are described.
The AVISPA framework is composed of several modules. A translator called HLPSL2IF
for transforming HLPSL specifications to a low level specification with IF language (In-
termediate Format) and four different verification backends to analyze the IF specifica-
tions. These backends are named: On the Fly Model Checker(OFMC) [3], Constraint-
Logic based Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe) [21], SAT basedModel-Checker (SAT-MC) [2]
and Tree Automata based Protocol Analyser (TA4SP) [4].
Each backend has its own options and parameters to define before the verification.
After the verification process, the output describes the result, and under what condi-
tions it has been obtained. The output format is common to all backends of the AVISPA
tool. In the SUMMARY section; it indicates if the protocol is safe, unsafe, or if the anal-
ysis is inconclusive. In a second section titled DETAILS, the tool explains under what
conditions/reasons the protocol is declared safe/unsafe/inconclusive. The next sections,
PROTOCOL, GOAL and BACKEND recall the name of the protocol, the goal of the anal-
ysis and the name of the back-end used, respectively. Finally, some possible comments
and statistics of the execution are described and the trace of the attack (if any) is printed
in an Alice&Bob notation which means that a given goal has been violated.
5.2 The HLPSL Format
The protocol and the verification assumptions are specified in the High Level Proto-
col Specification Language (HLPSL) [5]. HLPSL is a specification language for for-
malizing protocols and security goals based on Lamport’s Temporal Logic of Actions
(TLA) [13]). The language, developed in the context of the AVISPA framework [1], is
a role-based language focusing on roles rather than on messages exchange. Roles can
be basic (cf., agent roles) describing the action of an agent during the execution of
the protocol or composed (cf., session and environment roles) describing scenarios of
basic roles to model an entire protocol run including the adversary model.
Basic Roles. Figure 1(a) shows how the basic role is generally structured. Each basic
role declares its name (designed by A), its initial information or parameters (denoted by
param) and the agent playing the role (denoted by ag). The basic role can declare a
set of local variables (denoted by L). The init section assigns the initial values to the
local variables, if required.
  
role A(param) played by ag  
def= local L 
init Init 
transition 
evt.0 ^ evt.1 = | > act.1 
evt.2 = | > act.2 
... 
evt.n = | > act.n 
end role 
(a) role S (param)  
def= const C 
composition 
R1 (param-1) ^ . . . ^ Rn 
(param-n) 
end role 
(b) 
role environment (param)  
def= const C 
intruder_knowledge = IN 
composition 
S1 (param-1) ^ . . . ^ Sn 
(param-n) 
end role 
(c) 
goal 
secrecy_of sec_kn 
end goal 
(d) 
Fig. 1.HLPSL main elements. (a) Basic role structure. (b) Session role structure. (c) Environment
role structure. (d) Secrecy in the goal section.
The transition section describes changes of the agent state. It consists of a
trigger (e.g., evt.2) and an action (e.g., act.2) to be performed when the trigger
event occurs. The = | > symbol separates the two phases.
Composed Roles. Composed roles combine basic roles, either in parallel or in se-
quence. HLPSL defines two composed roles: the session role and the environment role.
Actions, in composed roles, are not defined in a transition section like in basic
roles. Rather, a composition section is defined to instantiate other roles Ri or Si
(with sets of parameters param-i) that run in parallel (cf., Figures 1(b) and 1(c)).
The session role (named S), instantiates in its composition section the basic roles
and the different channels relating them while the environment role instantiates in its
composition section all the sessions to be run (referred by Si). The environment role
is called the main role, as it declares the global constants (denoted by C) and defines
the intruder knowledge (i.e., the information that the adversary knows and eavesdrops,
denoted by IN).
Security Properties. HLPSL provides an independent section to declare the security
properties required, named goal. The goal declaration can be done either by using
predefined macros of the security properties (secrecy, weak authentication, strong au-
thentication) or by using Linear Temporal Logic formulas [13]. We are interested in the
secrecy property (cf. reference [5] for its complete definition).
The property is added to the honest basic role and identified by protocol_id
type. It is declared later in the goal section. For example, assuming that sec_kn is the
name of the secret term, the secret(Knew’,sec_kn,A,B) expression is added in
the honest player of the role claiming that Knew’ must be a secret term and that it is
known only by the two agents A and B. The constant sec_kn is declared later in the
goal section as seen in the Figure 1(d).
6 Automatic Verification of the Protocol
Modeling the Protocol and the Assumptions in HLPSL. The specification of both the
protocol (cf., Section 3) and the verification assumptions (cf., Section 4) is described
into five HLPSL sections: two sections for the basic roles (the tag and the reader) and
two sections for the composed roles (the session and the environment roles). A special
section is dedicated to the secrecy goal. Due to space restrictions, we only show in
Figure 2 one basic role (the RFID role) beginning by Step 3, one composed role (the
environment role) and the goal section1.
We assume that the reader and the tag execute some key generation function, ini-
tialized by the master key (K or Knew) and an internal state (Instate), to generate the
derived keys. The output value of this function is used as an input of the next execu-
tion, defining a succession of internal states and of derived keys. For that aim, we use
an HLPSL function of type hash_fun to specify the generation function called Key-
gen. This function is supposed to be known to the intruder. Thus, the intruder is able
to calculate the successors of Keygen(Li,Instate), called also the derived keys, and can
1 Full HLPSL code available at: http://j.mp/FPS2011
 
RFID role 
role tag (B,A : agent,   
Keygen : hash_func,  
Tagid,Opreq,Tmp : text, 
Snd,Rcv : channel (dy))  
played_by B def= 
 
 
local  
State : nat, 
L,L1,L2,L3,L4,L5,L6,L7 : message, 
Instate: text, 
Opwr   : text, 
Kold   : text, 
Knew   : text 
 
init 
State:=0 
 
transition  
 
1. State=0 
^Rcv(xor(Tagid,L'))  =|>  
State':=1  
^Instate' :=new() 
^L1':= Keygen(L',Instate') 
^Snd(L1') 
 
2. State=1 
^Rcv(xor((Knew'.Tmp),L2')) =|>  
^State':=2  
^Instate' :=new() 
^L3':= Keygen(Knew,Instate') 
^Snd(L3') 
 
 
 
 
3. State=2 
^Rcv(xor((Opreq.Tmp),L4')) =|> 
State' :=3 
^Instate' :=new() 
^L5':= Keygen(L4',Instate') 
^Snd(L5') 
 
4. State=3 
^Rcv(xor((Opwr'.Tmp),L6')) =|> 
State' :=4 
^Instate' :=new() 
^L7':= Keygen(L6',Instate') 
^Snd(L7') 
 
Environment role 
role environment() def= local 
Snd, Rcv: channel(dy) 
const 
sec_kn: protocol_id, 
a, b: agent, 
keygen: hash_func, 
tagid,opreq,tmp  : text, 
l,l1,l2,l3,l4,l5,l6,l7: message 
 
intruder_knowledge = {a,b,tagid, 
opreq,tmp,keygen,l,l1,l2,l3,l4, 
l5,l6,l7} 
 
composition 
session(a,b,keygen,tagid,opreq,tmp) 
 
goal 
secrecy_of sec_kn, sec_opwr 
end goal 
Fig. 2. Specification sketch of the protocol in HLPSL.
  
% OFMC 
SUMMARY 
  SAFE 
DETAILS 
  BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS 
PROTOCOL 
  FPS2011Protocol.if 
GOAL 
  as_specified 
BACKEND 
  OFMC 
COMMENTS 
STATISTICS 
  parseTime: 0.00s 
  searchTime: 2.18s 
  visitedNodes: 1715 nodes 
  depth: 8 plies 
(a) %CL-AtSe 
SUMMARY 
  SAFE 
DETAILS 
  BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS 
  TYPED_MODEL 
PROTOCOL 
  FPS2011Protocol.if 
GOAL 
  As Specified 
BACKEND 
  CL-AtSe 
STATISTICS 
  Analysed   : 3 states 
  Reachable  : 3 states 
  Translation: 0.01 seconds 
  Computation: 0.00 seconds 
(b) 
Fig. 3. Evaluation results. (a) OFMC results. (b) CL-AtSe results.
invert the outputs of the Keygen function only if he knows/deduces all the entries of
Keygen (e.g., the updated internal state (Instate)). In the environment role, as channels
in AVISPA are until now of only type (dy) relying on the Dolev-Yao intruder model [7],
we define a passive adversary by adding to his knowledge all the data transmitted in
the network in addition to the knowledge of the key generation function and the stan-
dards used in the communication, without attributing him an active role to play in the
composition section. Finally, in the goal section, the Master key and the data written on
the tag are specified as (sec_kn) and (sec_opwr) respectively, to be checked for secrecy
requirements.
Obtained Results. We have used the OFMC and CL-AtSe backends of the AVISPA
framework. Both the OFMC and CL-AtSe backends support analyzing protocols with
Exclusive-OR properties. They do it for a bounded number of sessions. The backends
are called with the default options.
Results have reported the protocol as safe (cf. Figure 3), meaning that the stated
security goals (cf. Section 6) are successfully checked by the OFMC and CL-AtSe
backends for a bounded number of sessions. Therefore, we can affirm that our protocol
satisfies the secrecy of the sensitive data, named the master key and the data written in
the tag, with respect to a passive intruder, as specified in the environment role.
7 Conclusion
Motivated by the security flaws of the EPC Gen2 RFID specification, and the lack of
formally verified security enhancements for this technology, we are working towards
the specification and deployment of a key establishment protocol for Gen2 systems.
In this paper, we have described the specification and formal verification of an early
version of the protocol using the AVISPA model checking tool. We have presented how
we described the protocol using the HLPSL format, and verified the secrecy property of
the protocol under the presence of a passive adversary. We have then showed how we
used two of the verification algorithms implemented in the AVISPA tool to analyze the
security of the main cryptographic primitive used in the proposed protocol.
As future perspectives, we aim at continuing the evaluation of the protocol under the
presence of an active adversary. In this regard, more security goals must be considered,
particularly for guaranteeing the authenticity of the reader. We also plan to define the
appropriate key generation functions, and their introduction to the constrained environ-
ment of a Gen2 tag. This contribution shall allow us to decide about the refresh period
of the established keys.
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